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Abstract—Ensuring the physical layer security (PHY-security)
of millimeter wave (mmWave) communications is one of the key
factors for the success of 5G. Recent field measurements show
that conventional fading models cannot accurately model the
random fluctuations of mmWave signals. To tackle this challenge,
the fluctuating two-ray (FTR) fading model has been proposed.
In this correspondence, we comprehensively analyze the PHY-
security in mmWave communications over FTR fading channels.
More specifically, we derive analytical expressions for significant
PHY-security metrics, such as average secrecy capacity, secrecy
outage probability, and the probability of strictly positive secrecy
capacity, with simple functions. The effect of channel parameters
on the PHY-security has been validated by numerical results.
Index Terms—Average secrecy capacity, physical layer security,
millimeter wave, fluctuating two-ray fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a promising technique for supporting skyrocket data
rate in fifth-generation (5G), millimeter wave (mmWave) com-
munications have received an increasing attention due to the
large available bandwidth at mmWave frequencies [1]. Given
the ubiquitousness of wireless channels, mmWave communi-
cations are particularly vulnerable to a set of eavesdropping
and impersonation attacks. Compared to cryptographic tech-
nologies implemented at upper layers, physical layer security
(PHY-security) is a low-complexity alternative that exploits the
randomness of wireless channels to safeguard the confidential
information transmission [2].
An increasing number of literatures show their interests
of exploring the PHY-security in mmWave communications
[3]–[5]. For example, the effect of peculiar mmWave channel
characteristics on the PHY-security performance in mmWave
Ad hoc networks has been studied in [3]. In [4], PHY-security
transmissions under slow fading channels with multipath prop-
agation in mmWave communications were studied. However,
both [3] and [4] neglected the small-scale fading of mmWave
channel. Leveraging on a stochastic geometry framework, the
authors of [5] investigated the downlink PHY-security perfor-
mance in an mmWave cellular network assuming Nakagami-
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m fading. Moreover, the PHY-security performance of hybrid
mmWave networks has been investigated in [6], [7].
Most of works only pay attention to the PHY-security in
mmWave communications over slow fading channels. The
small-scale channel model is also important for taking a deeper
look into signal processing for mmWave communications,
such as beamforming and precoding. Very recently, a 28
GHz outdoor measurement campaign showed that conven-
tional small-scale fading models [8] (e.g., Rayleigh, Rician
and Nakagami-m) cannot accurately model the random fluctu-
ations suffered by mmWave signals [9]. In order to circumvent
this issue, the fluctuating two-ray (FTR) fading model pro-
posed in [10] can capture the bimodality of mmWave channels,
which is more accurate than conventional fading models.
Therefore, the PHY-security performance of mmWave com-
munications over FTR fading channels is still a significant
and unsolved problem. Motivated by that, we provide a
further investigation on the comprehensive analysis of the
PHY-security performance of mmWave communications and
derive analytical exact expressions for the average secrecy
capacity (ASC), the secrecy outage probability (SOP), and
the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC).
Since the FTR includes Rayleigh, Rician, and Nakagami-
m as special cases, the derived results can reduce to many
pioneering works. Moreover, our work is beneficial to evaluate
the state of the art PHY-security techniques and get better
insight into the application of the FTR fading models in
practical mmWave communications.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Hereafter, we consider the classic Wyner’s wiretap model,
which has been widely applied in the PHY-security analysis
for mmWave communications [5]–[7], [11]. Suppose that the
source S sends a message to the legitimate receiver D over
the main channel while the eavesdropperE attempts to decode
this message from its received signal through the eavesdropper
channel. It is assumed that the main and eavesdropper channels
experience independent FTR fading. Furthermore, we assume
that the full channel state information (CSI) of both main and
eavesdropper channels is available at S.
A. FTR Channel Model
The FTR channel model consists of two fluctuating specular
components with random phases plus a diffuse component,
and incorporates ground reflections in mmWave channels [10].
The probability distribution function (PDF) and cumulative
2distribution function (CDF) of the instantaneous signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) over FTR channel are expressed as [12]
fi (γi) =
mmii
Γ (mi)
∞∑
ji=0
Kjii dji
ji!ji!
γjii
(2σ2i )
ji+1
exp
(
−
γi
2σ2i
)
, (1)
Fi (γi) =
mmii
Γ (mi)
∞∑
ji=0
Kjii dji
ji!ji!
γ
(
ji + 1,
γi
2σ2i
)
, (2)
where i ∈ {D,E} represents the main channel or the eaves-
dropper channel, dji is expressed in terms of the fading
parametersmi, Ki and ∆i, defined in [12, Eq. (9)], and γ (·, ·)
is the incomplete gamma function [13, Eq. (8.350.1)].
The performance of mmWave links is also affected by large-
scale blockages, such as buildings, in urban areas. Several past
research works, e.g. [14] and references therein, have pointed
out that blockages result in significant differences between the
path loss characteristics of the line-of-sight (LOS) and the non-
line-of-sight (NLOS) components. In [14], the so-called LOS
ball blockage model has been considered which approximates
general LOS probability functions as a step function to render
mathematical analysis tractable. According to this model, the
LOS probability of the link equals to one within a certain
sphere of fixed radius RB and zero elsewhere. Assuming that
the propagation distance, ri, lies within this sphere, the average
SNR at D or E is given as
γ¯i = (Eb/N0) 2σ
2
i (1 +Ki) r
−ηi
i , i ∈ {D,E}, (3)
where Eb/N0 is the energy per bit to the noise power spectral
density ratio, ηi is path-loss exponent, and 2σ
2
i is the average
power of the diffuse component over the FTR fading.
B. Truncation Error
By truncating (1) up to the first Ni+1 terms, the truncation
error is given as
fˆi (γi) =
mmii
Γ (mi)
Ni∑
ji=0
Kjii djiγ
ji
i exp
(
− γi
2σ2
i
)
ji!Γ (ji + 1) (2σ2i )
ji+1
. (4)
The truncation error of the area under the fi (γi) to the first
Ni + 1 terms is given by
εi (Ni) ,
∫
∞
0
fi (γi) dγi −
∫
∞
0
fˆi (γi) dγi. (5)
Substituting (1) and (4) into (5) and with the help of [13, Eq.
(8.312.2)], (5) can be expressed in closed-form as
εi (Ni) = 1−
mmii
Γ (mi)
Ni∑
ji=0
Kjii dji
ji!
. (6)
Table I depicts the statistic truncation parameter Ni for
different combinations of channel parameters. Note that the
maximum required term for accurate Ni is only 27 in all
considered cases. In the realistic propagation environment, the
main channel and the eavesdropper channel may have different
fading parameters, which results different values of truncation
parameters. In this case, we define the truncation parameter
N as N , max{ND, NE}.
TABLE I
REQUIRED TERMS Ni FOR THE TRUNCATION ERROR (εi ≤ 10
−5) WITH
DIFFERENT CHANNEL PARAMETERSmi ,Ki , AND∆i .
FTR Fading Parameters Ni εi
mi=15.5, Ki=5, ∆i=0.4 24 6.27× 10
−6
mi=8.5, Ki=5, ∆i=0.35 27 6.025× 10
−6
mi=25.5, Ki=3, ∆i=0.48 16 8.447× 10
−6
III. PHY-SECURITY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OVER FTR
FADING CHANNELS
A. ASC Analysis
Recall that the full CSI of both the main and eavesdropper
channels is available at S, which is called as active eaves-
dropping [15]. In such a scenario, S can adapt the achievable
secrecy rate to Rs such that Rs ≤ Cs. Thus, according to
[16], the instantaneous secrecy capacity is defined as
Cs (γD, γE) = max {ln (1 + γD)− ln (1 + γE) , 0} , (7)
where ln (1 + γD) and ln (1 + γE) are the capacity of the
main and eavesdropper channels, respectively. Since both main
and eavesdropper channels experience independent fading, the
ASC can be given by
C¯s (γD, γE) =
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
0
Cs (γD, γE) f (γD, γE) dγDdγE
=
∫
∞
0
ln (1 + γD) fD (γD)FE (γD)dγD︸ ︷︷ ︸
I1
+
∫
∞
0
ln (1 + γE) fE (γE)FD (γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I2
−
∫
∞
0
ln (1 + γE) fE (γE)dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I3
, (8)
where f (γD, γE) = fD (γD) fE (γE) is the joint pdf of γD
and γE . With the help of (1), (2) and (8), we can obtain the
ASC over FTR fading channels in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The ASC over FTR fading channels can be
expressed as (??) at the end of next page, where
S (w, µ) , (w − 1)!eu
w∑
k=1
Γ (−w + k, µ)
µk
. (10)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Note that (??) is given in terms of only simple functions,
which can be efficiently evaluated in common softwares.
B. SOP Analysis
When S has no information about the eavesdroppers chan-
nel, S has no choice but to encode the confidential data
into codewords of a constant rate Rs. If Rs 6 Cs, perfect
secrecy can be achieved and information theoretic security is
compromised. The SOP is defined as the probability that the
instantaneous secrecy capacity falls below a target rate, which
is an important PHY-security performance metric and widely
3used to characterize wireless communications. The SOP can
be expressed as [17]
SOP = P {Cs (γD, γE) < Rs}
= P {γD < ΘγE +Θ− 1}
=
∫
∞
0
FD (ΘγE +Θ− 1) fE (γE) dγE , (11)
where Rs > 0 is the target secrecy capacity threshold, and
Θ , eRs . Substituting (1) and (2) into (11), we can obtain the
SOP over FTR fading channels in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The SOP over FTR fading channels can be
expressed as
SOP =
mmDD m
mE
E
Γ (mD) Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !
×
(
1−
jD∑
n=0
n∑
q=0
(
n
q
)
1
n!jE !
exp
(
−
Θ− 1
2σ2D
)
×
Θq(Θ− 1)
n−q
Γ (jE + 1 + q)
(
2σ2E
)q(
1 +
σ2
E
Θ
σ2
D
)jE+q+1
(2σ2D)
n

 . (12)
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
By adopting a similar method in [18], we derive the lower
bound of the SOP based on (11) as
SOPL = P {γD < ΘγE} ≤ SOP. (13)
Substituting (1) and (2) into (13), the lower bound of the
SOP over FTR fading channels is derived in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 3. The lower bound of the SOP over FTR fading
channels can be expressed as
SOPL =
mmDD m
mE
E
Γ (mD) Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !
×
(ρη)
jEΘjD+1
(Θ + ρη)
jD+jE+1
jE∑
k=0
(
Θ
ρη
)k
(jD + jE + 1)!
(jD + 1 + k)! (jE − k)!
,
(14)
where ρ , γ¯D
γ¯E
=
σ2D(KD+1)
σ2
E
(KE+1)
and η , KE+1
KD+1
.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
C. SPSC Analysis
The probability of SPSC, which is a fundamental benchmark
in secure communications, can be obtained by [17]
SPSC = P {Cs (γD, γE) > 0} = P {γD > γE}
= 1− SOPLRs=0. (15)
Therefore, we can obtain SPSC by substituting (14) into (15)
and setting Θ = eRs = 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present some plots that illustrate the
ASC, SOP and SPSC of mmWave communications over FTR
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Fig. 1. ASC over FTR fading channels against γ¯D for different values of γ¯E
(KD = 15, KE = 5,mD = 5.5,mE = 8.5, ∆D = 0.4, and ∆E = 0.35).
fading channels with. For the Monte Carlo simulation, 106
realizations of FTR fading channels are generated to validate
the analytical expressions derived in previous sections and the
propagation distance ri is normalized to 1 km.
The ASC as a function of γ¯D in dB is depicted in Fig. 1
for γ¯E = 3, 6, 9 dB. The outputs of a Monte Carlo simulator
are shown to exactly match with the analytical results, which
validates our derived results. As expected, the performance
of ASC improves with increasing γ¯D or decreasing γ¯E . Note
that the ASC will fall to zero if the average SNR of the main
channel is smaller than the eavesdropper channel (γ¯D < γ¯E ),
which is consistent with (7).
In Fig. 2, we portray the exact and the lower bound of SOP
as a function of the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel
γ¯E . The high-SNRs of γ¯E make the lower bound of the SOP
sufficiently tight with the exact SOP. It is clear that the lower
bound of SOP becomes accurate as the value of Rs decreases.
Moreover, it can be observed that the SOP performance of the
considered system is improved by decreasing the values of γ¯E ,
which is consistent with the results presented in Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3.
Fig. 3 investigates the impact of the ratios between γ¯D
and γ¯E , ρ, on the SOP performance. The achievable secrecy
rates Rs are considered (Rs = 1, 2, 3, 4 bit/s/Hz). Intuitively,
as ρ become large, the main channel is much better than
the eavesdropper channel and the SOP becomes decreasingly
substantial. In addition, smaller Rs can obtain smaller SOP,
which is consistent with the results presented in Lemma 2.
Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of shadowing on the SPSC
performance of mmWave communications over FTR fading
channels. As can be readily observed, the light shadowing
(small values of m) in eavesdropper channel will increase
the SPSC. Furthermore, in the moderate- and high-ρ regime,
increasing the shadowing effect of the main channel mD can
increase the SPSC performance, which is not observed in the
very low-ρ regime.
V. CONCLUSION
In this correspondence, we investigate the PHY-security
performance of mmWave communications over FTR fading
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Fig. 3. SOP over FTR fading channels against ρ for different values of Rs
(KD = KE = 8, mD = mE = 5.5, and ∆D = ∆E = 0.4).
channels. We derive analytical expressions for the ASC, SOP
and SPSC in terms of simple functions, which can quickly and
steadily converge with only a few of N terms to obtain a de-
sired accuracy. Note that derived results can reduce to many pi-
oneering works, since the FTR includes Rayleigh, Rician, and
Nakagami-m as special cases. Our analysis validates that the
performance of the considered system can be improved with
increasing the average SNR of the main channel or decreasing
the average SNR of the eavesdropper channel. Moreover, the
light shadowing (small values of m) in eavesdropper channel
will increase the SPSC. As for current and future directions,
it is of interest to investigate the PHY-security performance
of mmWave communications by considering more practical
channel and system features, such as blockages, interference,
and multi-antenna.
VI. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
For the natural number ji, the gamma function Γ (·) can
be expressed as Γ (ji + 1) = ji! [13, Eq. (8.339.1)]. Then,
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Fig. 4. SPSC over FTR fading channels against ρ for different values of mD
and mE (KD = KE = 8, ∆D = ∆E = 0.3, and Rs = 0).
substituting (1) and (2) into (8), I1 can be expressed as
I1 =
mmDD
Γ (mD)
mmEE
Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !jD!jE !(2σ2D)
jD+1
×
∫
∞
0
ln (1 + γD) γ
jD
D e
−
γD
2σ2
D γ
(
jE + 1,
γD
2σ2E
)
dγD︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
, (16)
In order to solve the inner integral A1, with the help of [13,
Eq. (8.354.1)], we have
γ
(
jE + 1,
γD
2σ2E
)
= jE !
(
1− e
−
γD
2σ2
E
jE∑
n=0
1
n!
(
γD
2σ2E
)n)
.
(17)
Substituting (17) into A1 and formulating the integral as
S (w, µ) ,
∫
∞
0
ln (1 + t) tw−1e−µtdt, we can obtain
A1 = jE !S
(
jD + 1,
1
2σ2D
)
− jE !
jE∑
n=0
1
n!
(
1
2σ2E
)n
S
(
jD + n+ 1,
σ2D + σ
2
E
2σ2Dσ
2
E
)
. (18)
Since w is a natural number in the integral S (w, µ), we can
have (10) as in [19]. Substituting (18) and (10) into (16), and
after a simple transformation of the variables, I1 is given as
I1 =
mmDD m
mE
E
Γ (mD) Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !jD!(2σ2D)
jD+1
(19)
×

S(jD + 1, 1
2σ2D
)
−
jE∑
n=0
S
(
jD + n+ 1,
σ2D+σ
2
E
2σ2
D
σ2
E
)
n!(2σ2E)
n

 .
Following similar steps, we can obtain I2 and I3 as
I2 =
mmDD m
mE
E
Γ (mD) Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !jE !(2σ2E)
jE+1
(20)
×

S(jE + 1, 1
2σ2E
)
−
jD∑
n=0
S
(
jE + n+ 1,
σ2D+σ
2
E
2σ2
D
σ2
E
)
n!(2σ2D)
n

 .
5I3 =
mmEE
Γ (mE)
∞∑
jE=0
KjEE djES
(
jE + 1, (2σ
2
E)
−1
)
jE !jE !(2σ2E)
jE+1
. (21)
Then, we can obtain (??) by combining (19), (20) and (21).
B. Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting (1) and (2) into (11), we can obtain
SOP =
mmDD m
mE
E
Γ (mD) Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !jD!jE !(2σ2E)
jE+1
×
∫
∞
0
γjEE e
−
γE
2σ2
E γ
(
jD + 1,
ΘγE +Θ− 1
2σ2D
)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I4
. (22)
With the help of [13, Eq. (8.354.1)], I4 can be expressed as
I4 = jD!
∫
∞
0
γjEE e
−
γE
2σ2
E dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I5
−jD!
jD∑
n=0
1
n!
(
1
2σ2D
)n
e
1−Θ
2σ2
D
×
∫
∞
0
γjEE e
−
γE
2σ2
E
−
ΘγE
2σ2
D (ΘγE +Θ− 1)
ndγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I6
. (23)
Using [13, Eq. (3.326)] and [13, Eq. (1.111)], we have
I5 = Γ (jE + 1)
(
2σ2E
)jE+1
, (24)
I6 =
n∑
q=0
(
n
q
)
Θq(Θ− 1)
n−q
Γ (jE + 1 + q)(
1
2σ2
E
+ Θ
2σ2
D
)jE+q+1 . (25)
The proof concludes by combining (22), (23), (24), and (25).
C. Proof of Lemma 3
Substituting (1) and (2) into (13), we can obtain
SOPL =
mmDD m
mE
E
Γ (mD) Γ (mE)
∞∑
jD=0
∞∑
jE=0
KjDD djDK
jE
E djE
jD!jE !jD!jE !(2σ2E)
jE+1
×
∫
∞
0
γjEE exp
(
−
γE
2σ2E
)
γ
(
jD + 1,
ΘγE
2σ2D
)
dγE︸ ︷︷ ︸
I7
. (26)
With the help of [13, Eq. (6.455.2)], I7 can be expressed as
I7 =
Γ (jD + jE + 2)
(jD + 1)
(
Θ
2σ2D
)jD+1( Θ
2σ2D
+
1
2σ2E
)
−(jD+jE+2)
× 2F1
(
1, jD + jE + 2; jD + 2;
σ2EΘ
σ2EΘ+ σ
2
D
)
, (27)
where 2F1 (·, ·; ·; ·) is the Gauss hypergeometric function [13,
Eq. (9.14)]. Using [20, Eq. (7.3.1.129)], the proof concludes
by combining (27) and (26) with some simplifications.
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